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Kant and Aesthetics: 
an Introduction 
 
 
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 and died in 1804, having lived most of his life in 
Konigsberg, a small German city with an undistinguished university. In 1766 he was 
appointed professor for the first time at the university. He gave an inaugural lecture as 
required and then proceeded to publish nothing at all for a dozen years. Why? 
 
The answer came in 1781 with the publication of the first of three great critiques that he 
was to write, The Critique of Pure Reason (or, more clearly, the critique of reason purely 
employed). Without exaggeration one may say that this book revolutionized philosophy 
and much of the remainder of the intellectual map as well. 
 
What did Kant do? To answer that question, we must first ask: what do philosophers 
do? And what major transitions have occurred in their manner of doing it? The answers, 
as with all philosophical answers, are matters of disagreement within philosophy, but 
here they are. 
 
Philosophy is the discipline within which we try to determine how we ought to be: 
  
how ought we to believe (that is, what is true)? 
how ought we to behave toward each other (that is, what is ethical); 
how ought we to structure our lives (that is, what if anything is teleological); 
how ought we to structure works of art (that is, what is beautiful);  
and so forth. 
 
At various times various of the above questions have taken precedence. I believe, 
however, that the history of philosophy has witnessed only three major 
transformations. 
 
1. The origination of philosophy by the Greeks in their attempt to 
distinguish reality from appearance (hence the focus on ontological questions). 
 
2. The 'Copernican Revolution' of Kant in his attempt to distinguish what we 
can know from what we can only conjecture (for there may be things which are 
real but cannot be known to be real). 
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3. The linguistic transformation of Wittgenstein in his attempt to distinguish 
what we can say from what we cannot say (for there may be things, he believed, 
that can be known but cannot be said). (I suspect that a fourth transformation 
may occur, namely a consensus that perhaps Wittgenstein went too far. We 
must rather, long after Plato, refocus upon what can be taught, for what can be 
taught can be known regardless of whether it can or cannot be said).) 
 
Kant, therefore, precipitated the first major transformation within philosophy 2000 
years after its birth, and many philosophers believe that he got it essentially right (that 
the latter linguistic transformation, that is, was either a momentary aberration or simply 
the working out of ideas already present in Kant). 
 
With that background, let's look more directly at what Kant did in his three great 
critiques, concluding with a sketch of his theory of the beautiful – for otherwise we shall 
surely misunderstand the point of the latter. 
 
(I shall try to speak with as few technicalities as possible - and that, with Kant, is not 
simple.) 
 
 
The First and Second Critiques 
 
What in summary was the argument of Kant's first two critiques of 'reason' (originally 
intended to be a single work establishing the scope and limits of reason in both its 
theoretical and practical employment)? 
 
1. Example of book before me: distinction between book as it appears and 
book as it is in itself, and hence between the book phenomenally construed as 
distinct from being noumenally construed. (Note: the world phenomenally 
construed is identical to the world noumenally construed; it is the same world!) 
 
2. Similar distinction with respect to self. 
 
Now, two questions: 
 
What can we know about the world as it appears to us? 
What can we believe (perhaps ought to believe) about that world as it is in itself? 
 
We answer the first question by noticing that we can only know by judging, and thus the 
forms of possible judgment delimit the possible forms of the world as it appears (after 
being filtered through the pure intuitions of space and time – space and time 
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conditioning particular encounters, and the schematized categories conditioning our 
general judgments about them). 
 
We answer the second question by noticing that we must frequently choose either to 
act in accordance with duty or otherwise (we are obliged by a moral imperative to act 
morally); and that we can act as we ought only if our maxims can be universalized. But 
that is to act as if we were free and immortal and as if our actions had an integrated 
place in a purposeful universe designed to accord with our cognitive and ethical 
purposes (to act, that is, as if God existed and were directing the universe purposefully 
for our benefit). 
 
We are thus justified through moral considerations in acting as if we are free and 
immortal and as if God existed. 
 
 
The Third Critique 
 
After writing the first two critiques, however, Kant realised that he had inadvertently 
disclosed a gulf between the world as recognized and the world as desired (between the 
world as encountered by reason in its theoretical employment, that is, and in its 
practical employment). Could this gulf be bridged? Is there something other than the 
faculties of understanding (cognition) and desire (morals) that could serve as a bridge 
between them (for as moral agents we assuredly seek by willing to impose moral order 
on this amoral world)? 
 
Kant suggested that the faculty of judging itself, when acting disinterestedly in 
aesthetic contemplation, effects this bridge, for beautiful works are the objects 
that we encounter that draw our attention most directly to the noumenal 
construal of the world – objects that appear necessarily to us to be purposive but 
without a concept of purpose. 
 
To understand Kant's claims about judgments of the beautiful, we must first distinguish 
sharply between two kinds of judgments. Suppose, for example, that I were to affirm 
the following six things of a chair.  
  
Objective judgments: The chair is red. 
The chair is heavy. 
The chair is metallic. 
 
Kant and Aesthetics: an Introduction Page 4 of 5 
Subjective judgments: The chair is interesting 
The chair is valuable. 
The chair is desirable. 
 
The latter subjective judgements seem to say something about the chair but actually say 
something only about how I relate to the chair. They affirm more exactly that 
 
     I am interested in the chair.  
     I value the chair highly.  
     I desire the chair. 
 
The difference between judging objectively and subjectively is crucial to comprehending 
the nature and consequences of Kant's account of how we encounter things as 
beautiful.  
 
To Kant, a judgment that an object or event is beautiful is a subjective rather 
than objective judgment.  
 
To claim that something is beautiful is to affirm how one relates to it rather than 
how it is. 
 
What does such a judgment tell us about the relationship between the subject and the 
object? To encounter an object or event as beautiful, Kant thought, one must be aware 
of two things. 
  
a. The object or event must seem to be designed to serve a particular 
purpose (it must appear, that is, to be purposive), even though one cannot 
conceive of any purpose for which it is designed; 
 
b. When attempting to fathom its seeming purposiveness, one must feel the 
harmonious and free interplay of one's understanding and imagination as a 
uniquely disinterested pleasure. 
 
So far, so subjective! Because the pleasure of our encounters with beautiful objects and 
events is uniquely disinterested, however (because, that is, of its formal or nonsensuous 
nature), two consequences follow that bridge the gulf between the world as 
encountered objectively versus subjectively and therewith phenomenally versus 
noumenally as well. 
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c. Being disinterested (that is, formal or nonsensuous), the pleasure 
accruing to our encounters with beautiful objects and events justifies our 
conviction that any being encountering them with similar understanding and 
imagination (that is, any being capable of experiencing them) ought to feel and 
thus judge of them as we do. 
 
d. Upon reflection, therefore, the beautiful objects and events that we 
encounter within our world as phenomenally construed symbolise (that is, draw 
our attention to) the same world construable noumenally, reminding us thereby 
of the bedrock moral nature of our human way of being within it. 
 
 
